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Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent
Statements Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence
By WALKER JAMESON BLAKEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The struggle over the adoption of uniform rules of evidence
for the federal courts has finally ended, and the new Federal
Rules of Evidence went into effect on July 1, 1975.1 Preparation
must now begin for a series of interlocking battles over the
interpretation and possible revision of these rules, and for dis-
putes over the effects which these Federal Rules of Evidence
should or will have on state evidence practices. One area which
will surely be the subject of controversy is the federal approach
to hearsay.
The ideas which comprise the federal rules on hearsay are
not completely new. Instead, they are the products of years of
labor by the distinguished committees which created the
Model Code of Evidence in 1942, the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence in 1953, the California Evidence Code in 1966, and the
drafts of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1969,2 19711 and
1972.1 The fact that these rules have now been adopted for
use in all federal courts gives the hearsay provisions great
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I wish to thank my
colleagues Henry Brandis, Jr. and Kenneth S. Broun for their discussions of hearsay
with me and my research assistant Michael R. Ferrell for his assistance with this
article.
1 28 U.S.C.A. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1975) [hereinafter cited as FED. R.
EVID.]. This compilation of the Federal Rules of Evidence includes both historical
notes and Advisory Committee's notes. For editorial comments, see 28 U.S.C.S.
APPENDIX: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1975).
1 See COMMrrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMNARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT CoURrS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES,
REVISED DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971) [hereinafter cited as REVISED DRAFT].
'See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED RULES].
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importance, and because the new hearsay provisions are suffi-
ciently different from the hearsay rules which have heretofore
been applied in most state and federal courts, they can aptly
be described as the "federal hearsay" system.
The most important features of this federal hearsay system
are as follows: (1) It defines hearsay so as to exclude from
hearsay any out-of-court statement or act which indicates a
belief by the person saying or doing it but which was not in-
tended by that person as a direct assertion of that belief.5 (2)
It permits substantive use of certain prior inconsistent state-
ments of a witness.' (3) It expands opportunities for introduc-
tion of such prior inconsistent statements by authorizing par-
ties to impeach their own witnesses.7 (4) It expands the scope
of the exception for admissions by a party to include all state-
ments by an agent or servant made during the existence of the
relationship "concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment" without regard to whether the em-
ployee was authorized to speak concerning the matter.' (5) In
addition to these inroads into the once formidable hearsay rule,
the federal hearsay system enumerates 27 other specifically
described exceptions.' Though none of these is totally original,
See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(2) and 801(c). The Advisory Committee's Note on Rule
801(a) states: "The effect of the definition of 'statement' is to exclude from the opera-
tion of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as
an assertion." PROPOSED RULES, supra note 4, at 293. This author discussed this aspect
of the Federal Rules of Evidence at length in You Can Say That If You Want-The
Redefinition of Hearsay in Rule 801 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 35 OHIo
ST. L.J. 601, 610-16 (1974). See also Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do"
Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 133 (1961); Finman, Implied Asser-
tions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV.
682 (1962); McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489 (1930).
6 See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A). Under this rule, a witness' prior inconsistent
statement may be used substantively if he is available to be cross-examined on the
prior statement and the statement was "inconsistent with his testimony, and was given
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
in a deposition."
I See FED. R. EVID. 607. See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 38 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK].
s FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D). The common law rule admitted into evidence vicari-
ous admissions by employees only if the employee was authorized by the party to
speak. See McNicholas v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.E. 889 (Mass. 1907).
The admissibility of these statements is codified in Rule 801(d)(2)(C).
I See FED. R. EID. 803 and 804. Each of these rules also has a catch-all exception.
See id. 803(24), 804(5). These are specifically discussed at notes 11-13 and accompany-
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many of these exceptions are not recognized in all states, and
even where an exception is recognized, the federal version of
the exception frequently expands its scope.' 0 (6) The federal
rules also provide a catch-all hearsay exception for evidence
which, although not qualifying under any of the specific excep-
tions, is, among other requirements, "more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable effort."" To avail
himself of this exception, the proponent of the hearsay evi-
dence must provide the adverse party with advance notice,'
2
and the court must find "circumstantial, guarantees of trust-
worthiness" equivalent to those presumed to exist in the spe-
cific hearsay exceptions.' 3 (7) Finally, the restrictions imposed
upon the use of hearsay are greatly relaxed in the area of expert
witnesses. Experts may now give their opinions "without prior
disclosure of the underlying facts or data unless the court re-
quires otherwise."' 4 Furthermore, the data relied on by the ex-
pert need not itself be admissible in evidence if "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
ing text infra.
11 For example, the common law rule prohibits the admission of unexcited state-
ments of present sense perception. See Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REv. 91, 98
(1937). See generally McCoRNHcK § 298. Federal Rule 803(1), however, makes admissi-
ble statements "describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declar-
ant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." This exception
is clearly distinct from the excited utterances exception. See FED. R. Evil. 803(2).
Modification of the common law of many states is also reflected in Rule 804(b)(2)
(dying declarations may now be used in civil cases) and Rule 803(16) (ancient docu-
ments need be only 20 years old instead of 30). The 20-year requirement for ancient
documents is also incorporated in Rule 901(b)(8), authorizing authentication of an-
cient documents. The 10-year reduction may possibly be explained on a "lowest com-
mon denominator" theory. The Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 901(b)(8) declares
that "any time period selected is bound to be arbitrary," but it points out that an
Oregon statute has already adopted the 20-year standard. See PROPOSED RULEs, supra
note 4, at 335.
11 FED. R. EVil. 803(24), 804(b)(5)(B).
12 Id.
,3 Id. Interestingly, one specific hearsay exception requires proof of circumstances
of trustworthiness. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3). Three other exceptions may be abro-
gated if the circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6),
(7), (8).
"1 FED. R. EVID. 705. This rule grants the court the discretion to discard the
impractical common law rule requiring disclosure of all the underlying facts. See
Treadwell v. Nickel, 228 P. 25, 35 (Cal. 1924) where the court refers to an 83-page
hypothetical question contained in the trial record.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject .... "5
Although the federal hearsay system will undoubtedly
make many significant contributions to the law of evidence, the
one development which this article will discuss is the use of
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. This
was potentially the most important change which the new fed-
eral rules would have made in the law of evidence because the
original version, drafted by the Advisory Committee on Rules
of Evidence and approved by the Supreme Court of the United
States, would have permitted all prior inconsistent statements
to be used substantively. 6 Congress, however, refused to enact
the Supreme Court's version, and instead narrowed the scope
of the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements to situa-
tions where the statement "was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in
a deposition."' 7 Even this restrictive rule will still be of consid-
erable significance in federal criminal prosecutions, and it will
have a substantial effect in civil cases.' 8 Whether the Supreme
Court's version of this rule should be reconsidered and adopted
is probably the most important issue which this article will
address. Also discussed, however, will be the language and op-
eration of the enacted rule, its restriction on the operation of
the federal evidence rules dealing with impeachment by prior
consistent statements, and the manner in which either the con-
gressional rule or the Supreme Court rule might affect forum
,1 FED. R. EVID. 703. The common law is split on this issue. The more prevalent
position is reflected in the federal court case of Harris v. Smith, 372 F.2d 806 (8th Cir.
1967), which held that "all plain substantial" facts underlying the hypothetical must
be supported by sufficient competent, though not uncontested, evidence. Id. at 812.
The new federal rule follows Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"[Tihe better reasoned authorities admit opinion testimony based, in part, upon
reports of others which are not in evidence but which the expert customarily relies upon
in the practice of his profession." Id. at 641.
,1 See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 4, at 293. Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(A) simply
states that the statement is not hearsay if the declarant is present and subject to cross-
examination, and the statement is "inconsistent with his testimony."
"FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1)(A).
18 Prior inconsistent statements uttered before a grand jury will qualify for use as
substantive evidence even under the congressional version of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). See
28 U.S.C.S. § 801.2 (Editorial Comment). Moreover, depositions will become more
valuable in civil cases because prior inconsistent statements contained in them will
now be usable as substantive evidence in situations in which the depositions them-
selves would not be admissible.
[Vol. 64
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shopping between state and federal courts.
In writing this analysis on the approach of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to substantive use of prior inconsistent state-
ments, the author has tried to keep in mind four different
points of view from which the federal hearsay system might be
examined. The first of these is from the perspective of an attor-
ney preparing a case for trial in a federal court under the new
rules. The second viewpoint is that of an attorney who is con-
sidering whether to file a particular action in a state or federal
court, or whether to remove a case to federal court, and who
wonders how the federal rules of evidence will affect his selec-
tion of forums. The third vantage point is that of the many
state draftsmen who will be considering whether their states
should adopt similar rules of evidence. These draftsmen will be
under considerable pressure to prepare state evidence rules
which are extremely similar to the federal evidence rules so as
to minimize the opportunities available to the forum-shopping
attorney just mentioned. Finally there is the viewpoint of fed-
eral draftsmen considering whether the new federal evidence
rules themselves should be revised.
This article will suggest several potential problems'9 in the
operation of the federal rule permitting substantive use of cer-
tain prior inconsistent statements, including some created by
the congressional restrictions. 2 The major recommendation
which this article will make to the draftsmen of any revisions
of the Rules is that they should not readopt the congression-
ally-rejected Supreme Court version of the prior inconsistent
statement rule allowing all prior inconsistent statements to be
used substantively.
I. THE CONGRESSIONAL VERSION OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULE
801(d)(1)(A)
The Federal Rules of Evidence, as adopted, authorize sub-
stantive use of certain prior inconsistent statements by declar-
ing such statements to be "not hearsay."2' Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
11 See Section II, entitled "The Congressional Version of Federal Evidence Rule
801(d)(1)(A)" infra.
2 See Section IV, entitled "Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence"
and Section V, entitled "Substantive Use of Prior Consistent Statements," infra.
11 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
1975]
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provides that a prior inconsistent statement made by a witness
who testifies at trial, and who is subject to present cross-
examination concerning the prior statement,12 is "not hearsay"
if the prior statement "was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceedings, or
in a deposition." This rule might be mistaken for a strangely
limited statement of the conventional doctrine that a prior
inconsistent statement may be admitted for the nonhearsay
use of impeaching the witness who made it even though it
cannot be admitted for the hearsay use of proving the truth of
its contents. 23 This rule is just the opposite, however. Because
these prior statements are defined as "not hearsay," the ban
on hearsay in Federal Evidence Rule 80224 does not apply to
them and they may be admitted for any relevant purpose in-
cluding proving the truth of their contents. 25
The earlier version of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), proposed by the
Advisory Committee and approved by the Supreme Court,
would have declared all prior inconsistent statements by a wit-
ness who testifies at the trial, and who is subject to cross-
22 See note 25 infra.
1 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain any reference to the traditional
rule permitting prior inconsistent statements to be introduced for the limited purpose
of impeachment but the rule can be detected in the broad general rules of relevancy
set forth in Rules 401, 402, and 403, the ban on "hearsay" in Rule 802, which applies
to prior inconsistent statements that do not qualify under 801 (d)(1)(A), and the provi-
sion for limited admissibility in Rule 105. For a general discussion of the traditional
view and the cracks appearing therein, see McCoRMICK § 251. The leading cases pro-
pounding substantive use are People v. Green, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1971),
on remand from the United States Supreme Court, see California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970) (statements made to police officer and at preliminary hearing), and Jett v.
Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969) (statement made in initial complaint to
sheriff).
2' Rule 802 provides: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or
by Act of Congress."
21 There is a theory that can be used to justify the draftsmen's language. This
theory is that the purpose of the hearsay rule is satisfied if there is an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination. Therefore, according to this theory, if prior state-
ments present no hearsay problem because of an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination then they are "not hearsay." See McCoRMICK § § 244-45. It appears to this
writer that this way of referring to substantive use of prior statements merely increases
the confusion in an area in which there is already confusion enough. Furthermore,
Section VII of this article will demonstrate that this theory overstates the value of an
opportunity to cross-examine the alleged declarant of a prior statement and that
substantive use of such prior statements does involve hearsay dangers.
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examination concerning the prior statements, to be nonhear-
say. When this proposed rule was considered by the House of
Representatives, however, the House added a requirement that
the prior inconsistent statement have been made "under oath
subject to cross-examination, and subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial or hearing or in a deposition . *... ,26 The
Senate restored the Supreme Court's version.27 This disagree-
ment was reconciled when the two houses reached a compro-
mise providing that, to be admissible for substantive purposes,
the prior inconsistent statement must have been given "under
oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or
other proceedings, or in a deposition. 28 The difference between
the House version, requiring that the statement have been
made "subject to cross-examination," and the version finally
adopted, providing that the statement must have been made
"under oath subject to the penalty of perjury" during some sort
of proceeding, is that statements made during testimony before
a grand jury, where only the prosecution may present evidence,
can now be used to support a verdict at a subsequent trial
despite a change of heart and story by the declarant.
29
Prior inconsistent statements given by a witness in testi-
mony before a state grand jury would also qualify under Rule
801(d)(1)(A) as substantive evidence in a federal trial. Further
extension is unclear, though, and it is impossible to predict how
far the term "other proceeding" will be stretched to include
prior sworn statements "subject to the penalty of perjury." It
is at least arguable that both congressional and state legislative
hearings will qualify.
The overall effect of the congressional restriction on the
2 120 CONG. REc. H559 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 15-16: "For all these reasons, we think
the House amendment should be rejected and the rule as submitted by the Supreme
Court reinstated."
21 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
Although the criminal defendant in federal court will be able to avail himself
of the new prior inconsistent statement rule, it appears that its major benefit will befall
prosecutors; and it seems reasonable to expect that federal prosecutors will greatly
increase the number of witnesses whom they present to the grand jury.
Depositions will also become more valuable in both civil and criminal cases be-
cause prior inconsistent statements contained in them will now be usable as substan-
tive evidence in situations in which the depositions themselves would not be admissi-
ble.
19751
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version propounded by the Supreme Court is to enormously
reduce the number of prior inconsistent statements available
to become substantive evidence. The restrictions do not neces-
sarily require, however, that the prior testimony have had any-
thing to do with the party against whom the prior inconsistent
statements are now offered as substantive evidence. It is true,
of course, that in some cases the opposing party will have had
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness during the trial or
proceeding in which the prior inconsistent statement was
given, but there is no guarantee that the opposing party, or a
party with a similar interest, or any party at all will have had
an opportunity to test the trustworthiness of the prior state-
ment.
This is in sharp contrast to the requirements which must
be met under the federal rules in order to substantively use the
prior testimony of an individual who is now unavailable. Rule
804(b) (1) declares that this latter exception to the hearsay rule
requires not only unavailability, but also that "the party
against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, [have] had an oppor-
tunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination." The prerequisite of unavail-
ability in Rule 804(b)(1) dictates that there can be no present
opportunity for cross-examination; and the latter requirement
means that the prior statement, to be admissible, must have
previously been subjected to an opportunity for cross-
examination to test its trustworthiness. In contradistinction,
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) allows previously untested prior statements
so long as the declarant is available for present cross-
examination. Advocates of substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements argue that the existence of an opportunity for pres-
ent cross-examination of the witness at trial provides adequate
protection for the party or parties against whom the evidence
is offered. Section VII of this article will argue, however, that
this opportunity for subsequent cross-examination at trial does
not provide adequate protection.
The congressional restrictions are intended to limit sub-
stantive use of prior inconsistent statements to those situations
in which there is likely to be overwhelming proof that the wit-
ness did in fact make the prior inconsistent statement. Discus-
sions of whether prior inconsistent statements should be given
substantive effect tend to assume not only the existence of such
prior statements, but also that they are inconsistent and that
[Vol. 64
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they were made by the witness. ° These assumptions are appar-
ently premised upon the further belief that any disputes as to
whether the statements were made are ordinary questions of
fact which can be satisfactorily resolved by the fact finder in
the subsequent trial. In truth, however, the evidence that is
offered to support a contention that the witness made a prior
inconsistent statement may be less than conclusive. It may
consist of the witness' own in-court admission, or a writing
containing several lines in one handwriting followed by what is
purportedly the witness' signature in another, 31 or merely testi-
mony by another witness that he remembers overhearing the
declarant make the prior inconsistent statement. Factual dis-
putes as to whether or not a witness actually made an out-of-
court statement are among the most difficult questions which
may be asked the fact finder. To add to this dilemma, even an
admitted oral statement or signed writing prepared by someone
else will often present subtle questions as to what was meant
by the statement or the signature.32
Although Rule 801(d) (1) (A) does not guarantee that the
prior statement will be properly understood, it does assure that
prior inconsistent statements offered as substantive evidence
are extremely likely to have actually been made.3 This is be-
cause all statements encompassed by the rule will have been
spoken by a witness under oath and "on the stand," and in
almost all cases they will have been preserved for future use by
a court reporter's transcript.
21 See MCCORMICK § 251; 3 J. WIGMORE, Evm_ cE § 1018 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE].
3, If a signed writing is used to prove a prior inconsistent statement, the witness
must first be provided an opportunity to read the document. See Washington v. State,
112 So. 2d 179 (Ala. 1959). McCormick states that the "actual invocation [of this rule]
in trials is relatively infrequent in most states . . . ." McCoRblICK § 29.
32 See note 134 and accompanying text infra.
The House Committee explained its similar limitation by stating:
The rationale for the Committee's decision is that (1) unlike in most other
situations involving unsworn or oral statements, there can be no dispute as
to whether the prior statement was made; and (2) the context of a formal
proceeding, an oath, and the opportunity for cross-examination provide firm
additional assurances of the reliability of the prior statement.
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE COMMITTEE
REPORT]. See also Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 147 (1973).
1975]
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I. THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF FEDERAL
EVIDENCE RULE 801(d)(1) (A)
There are three particular aspects of Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
that merit discussion at this point. The language of the rule
presents two problems, and there is one possible limitation
which its advocates insist will temper the rule's effect. The
problems which appear in the language of 801(d)(1)(A) are the
requirements that the declarant be subject to cross-
examination and that the prior statements be inconsistent with
his testimony. The uncertainty, which is not obvious from the
language of the rule, is the suggestion that prior inconsistent
statements, even when admitted substantively, are inferior evi-
dence which, by themselves, might not support a verdict.
A. Opportunity for Present Cross-Examination on Prior
Statement
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) requires that the declarant of the prior
inconsistent statement be "subject to cross-examination con-
cerning the statement" at the trial in which the prior inconsist-
ent statement is offered into evidence. This rule seems to as-
sume that if the declarant takes the stand at the trial in which
the inconsistent statement is offered into evidence, he will au-
tomatically be subject to cross-examination with respect to the
prior inconsistent statement by the side against whom the prior
statement is offered. However, under the usual rules control-
ling the use of cross-examination,34 which Federal Evidence
Rules 611(b) and 611(c) appear to reflect, 35 this would not be
Historically, a party has had no right to cross-examine his own witness. See,
e.g., Walker v. Warehouse Transp. Co., 235 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1956); Mulloney v.
United States, 79 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1935); State v. Williams, 192 N.W. 901 (Iowa 1923);
Johnson v. Hager, 83 P.2d 621 (Kan. 1938) (cross-examination allowed because of
exception for hostile witnesses); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 18 A.2d 828 (N.H. 1941) (ability
to cross-examine own witness held to be within the discretion of the trial court). See
generally MCCORMICK § 32, at 64. FED. R. EVID. 607 abolishes the prohibition against
a party impeaching his own witness, but FED. R. Evi. 611(c) will permit a party to
lead his own witness only under special circumstances.
3 FED. R. EVID. 611(b) states: "Cross-examination should be limited to the subject
matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.
The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as
if on direct examination." Rule 611(c) states: "Leading questions should not be used
on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his
[Vol. 64
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true if the party against whom the prior statement is offered
had called the witness. If the party opposing the statement had
called the witness, then the proponent of the prior inconsistent
statement could not introduce it in his cross-examination be-
cause any subsequent testing of its trustworthiness would be on
redirect examination, not cross-examination.
Of course, a party wishing to offer a prior inconsistent
statement could call the witness himself and thereby clearly
make cross-examination by the other party proper. The sensi-
ble solution, however, is to read the rule as authorizing cross-
examination by the opponent of the statement regardless of
who called the witness. But until that interpretation is adopted
by the courts, the literal language of 801(d) (1) (A) offers an
opportunity for an ironic dispute. Because the draftsmen of
801(d)(1)(A) tied the use of prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence to the touchstone of cross-examination,
even in a situation such as this one in which the parties are not
likely to consider cross-examination to be a very valuable right,
the party offering a prior inconsistent statement must argue
that the opposing party should be given a right to cross-
examine and the opposing party may argue that he has no such
right.
B. Requirement of Inconsistency
The second problem with the language of Rule
801(d)(1)(A) is that by its own terms the rule applies only to a
prior statement by a witness that is inconsistent with his pres-
ent testimony. If the witness manages to avoid making an as-
sertion concerning the subject of the prior statement, the prior
statement cannot be "inconsistent." An obvious problem
would occur when the witness claims that he cannot recall the
underlying facts of the prior statement. One solution to this
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination.
When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an
adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions." It is noteworthy that the
Supreme Court proposed to adopt the wide-open rule for use in federal courts, but
"Congress completely rewrote the Supreme Court statement of Rule 611(b) in order
to set forth the narrower, traditional rule which prevails in the federal courts and 39
state jurisdictions. . . ." 28 U.S.C.S. § 611.2 (Editorial Comment). See HousE COM-
MirrrEE REPORT, supra note 33, at 12.
19751
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problem, which has been adopted by several federal 6 and
California"7 courts, is to find that the witness' claimed lapse of
memory is false and that therefore the evidence which the wit-
ness sought to conceal should be admitted into evidence.," Al-
though the solution seems as obvious as the problem, the courts
have had difficulty couching the result in applied rules. In
United States v. Insana,5 for example, the Second Circuit
stated:
Where, as here, a recalcitrant witness who has testified
to one or more relevant facts indicates by his conduct that the
reason for his failure to continue to so testify is not a lack of
memory but a desire "not to hurt anyone," then the court has
discretionary latitude in the search for truth, to admit a prior
sworn statement which the witness does not in fact deny he
made . . . . However, this does not mean that the trial
judge's hands should be tied where a witness does not deny
making the statements nor the truth thereof but merely falsi-
fies a lack of memory. Here Schurman had testified in detail
before the grand jury, had already pleaded guilty, and on the
stand identified Insana and testified to two relevant events.
Based upon these facts, the only rational conclusion is that
Schurman was fully aware of the content of his grand jury
testimony but wished to escape testifying against Insana and
thus make a mockery of the trial. By conceding that his lack
of memory was due to his desire not to hurt anyone, he im-
pliedly admitted the truth of the extra-judicial statements
harmful to the defendant. Thus we believe that these state-
ments are admissible not only to impeach his claim of lack
of memory but also as an implied affirmation of the truth."
- See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 478 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1010 (1973); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
841 (1970).
3 See, e.g., People v. Green, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1971); People v.
Petersen, 100 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Ct. App. 1972); People v. Wheeler, 100 Cal. Rptr. 198
(Ct. App. 1971); People v. Moreno, 108 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Super. Ct. 1973). But see People
v. Sam, 454 P.2d 700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969) and People v. Carter, 120 Cal. Rptr.
181 (Ct. App. 1975), wherein the court held that honest lapses of memory are not
"inconsistent" and could not be used to trigger introduction of the prior statements.
Is For example, in People v. Green, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1971), the
court held admissible as substantive evidence a prior statement of drug involvement
in the face of the witness' claimed memory loss.
423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
Id. at 1170.
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The Supreme Court of California managed to make the
same result sound somewhat more plausible in its final decision
in People v. Green." In its first decision in that case,42 it had
held that the California statute permitting substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements43 violated the Constitution of the
United States." The State of California appealed that decision
to the United States Supreme Court, which held in California
v. Green 1 that at least some substantive use of prior inconsist-
ent statements is constitutional. Interestingly, although both
appellate courts had decided the constitutional question, nei-
ther had determined whether the declarations involved in
Green were actually admissible as prior inconsistent state-
ments under California Evidence Code § 1235.46
The facts in Green were that statements incriminating the
defendant had been made by Melvin Porter, a sixteen-year-old
minor who had been arrested for selling marijuana. At Green's
trial on the charge of supplying Porter with marijuana, Porter
was "markedly evasive and uncooperative . 7 His testimony is
difficult to summarize because he was led, impeached, and
then refreshed into making many contradictory statements,
48
but its overall thrust was that because he had taken a hallucin-
ogenic drug (LSD), he did not know whether or not the defen-
dant had supplied him with the marijuana.
49
Neither the trial court nor the California Supreme Court
believed Porter's claim that he did not know whether or not the
defendant had furnished the marijuana." After summarizing
facts which supported the conclusion that Porter was lying, 51
the Supreme Court of California used the following words to
justify turning Porter's denial of memory into a basis for the
41 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1971).
42 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
" CALIF. EvWD. CODE § 1235 (West 1966).
" 451 P.2d at 423, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 783. The constitutional provision held violated
was the right to confrontation.
' 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
' See id. at 153; 451 P.2d at 424 n.1, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 784 n.1.
" 451 P.2d at 423, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
" See 479 P.2d at 1000-04, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 496-500.
I Id.
" See 479 P.2d at 1002 n.5, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 498 n.5.
2, 479 P.2d at 1000-02, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 496-98.
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
introduction of his prior statements as both impeachment and
substantive evidence:
In normal circumstances, the testimony of a witness that
he does not remember an event is not "inconsistent" with a
prior statement by him describing that event. But justice will
not be promoted by a ritualistic invocation of this rule of
evidence. Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in
express terms, is the test for admitting a witness' prior state-
ment and the same principle governs the case of the forgetful
witness. In contrast to Sam, in which the witness had no
recollection whatever of the prior incident, here Porter admit-
tedly remembered the events both leading up to and follow-
ing the crucial moment when the marijuana came into his
possession, and as to that moment his testimony was equivo-
cal. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Porter's
deliberate evasion of the latter point in his trial testimony
must be deemed to constitute an implied denial that defen-
dant did in fact furnish him with the marijuana as charged.
His testimony was thus materially inconsistent with his pre-
liminary hearing testimony and his extra-judicial declaration
to Officer Wade, in both of which he specifically named de-
fendant as his supplier. Accordingly, the two prior statements
of this witness were properly admitted pursuant to Evidence
Code section 1235.52
If this approach is followed under Rule 801(d) (1) (A), as it
seems apparent that it will be,5 3 the trial judge will be forced
to make a determination as to the honesty of every claim of
lack of memory by a witness who has made prior affirmative
statements. Because of the potential effect of such a determi-
nation, it would appear that parties opposing introduction of
the prior statements would be entitled to ask for at least a voir
dire hearing at which they might offer evidence as to the truth
of the claim of loss of memory. In both Insana and Green,
however, the trial judges and the appellate courts made the
determination that the witness was lying on the basis of what
11 479 P.2d at 1002, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 498 (citations omitted). The Sam case is cited
and explained in note 37 supra.
See J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER, 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 801-81 to 801-87
(1975) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE]. Some of the facts of Green fall
within the limited scope of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), as some of the prior inconsistent state-
ments were made at a preliminary hearing.
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happened during the examination of the witness. 54 Further-
more, recent cases indicate that unless the judge is able to find
that the witness is lying about his lack of memory, the prior
statements will not be admissible.5
The draftsmen of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) required "inconsis-
tency" because they were attempting to give substantive effect
only to those prior statements which would be admissible any-
way for impeachment. 6 Under the orthodox theory of impeach-
ment, a prior statement cannot be used to discredit a witness
unless it is inconsistent with his in-court testimony. This has
been a difficult rule to apply,57 and it becomes even more trou-
blesome when the purpose of the introduction of the prior state-
ment is to prove an element of the case. It seems that the entire
1' For the determination in Insana, see 423 F.2d at 1165-68, 1170. Insana was an
extremely unusual case, however, in which the demeanor evidence visible to the trial
judge found its way into the "cold record." Footnote 1 states:
In the absence of the jury the court in describing the conduct of the
witness used these words:
"I have excused the jury because I want to talk very frankly here. It must
be clear to everybody who looks at this witness that he is faking and he is
attempting to avoid giving answers.
"His mumbling, the movements of his face and hands show a deter-
mined purpose on his part not to give anything unless it is extracted from
him. This is to the enjoyment and gratification of the defendant, which the
defendant has reflected by smiles of approval.
"It is quite evident, in other words, that this witness has in mind avoid-
ing testifying because he believes it is very likely to involve the defendant.
"We are here to get the truth and I do not think it lies in the lips or the
mind of any witness to thwart the truth purposely. This is a piece of hypo-
cracy [sic] which is as plain as the nose on your face, and I don't think we
ought to allow a mockery of justice to be displayed so openly and so indiffer-
ently."
Id. at 1167 n.1. The determination in Green can be found at 479 P.2d at 1000-02, 92
Cal. Rptr. at 496-98.
See People v. Sam, 454 P.2d 700, 77 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1969); People v. Carter, 120
Cal. Rptr. 181 (Ct. App. 1975).
" Such was also the reasoning of the draftsmen of CAUF. EVID. CODE § 1235, upon
which Rule 801(d)(1)(A) was based. For a discussion of the use of prior inconsistent
statements for impeachment purposes, see generally McCoRNuCK §§ 33-38.
" The question becomes, what degree of inconsistency is required? The earlier
cases tended to resolve any doubt in favor of the opponent of the prior statement. See,
e.g., Sanger v. Bacon, 101 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1913); State v. Bowen, 153 S.W. 1033 (Mo.
1913). Later cases reflect the now "more widely accepted view [that] any material
variance between the testimony and the previous statement will suffice." McCoRMICK
§ 34. See, e.g., Morgan v. Washington Trust Co., 249 A.2d 48 (R.I. 1969). Of course,
"materiality" is at best a subjective determination.
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situation could be clarified by merely changing the language of
the rule.5 Both inconsistency and lack of memory appear to
constitute equally adequate grounds for allowing substantive
use of prior statements,59 for both situations reflect a change in
position by the declarant. The distinction between a denial of
memory and an antithetical statement is in fact negligible and
should not justify separate treatment. Certainly this is true if
the prior statement was sworn testimony of which a transcript
was probably made."
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, in
California v. Green,61 suggested that lack of memory by the
alleged declarant might be a vital factor that would make sub-
stantive use of prior inconsistent statements unconstitutional
absent an opportunity for cross-examination at the time the
m The Kentucky Court of Appeals noted in Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d
788 (Ky. 1969) that both the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence eliminated the necessity for distinguishing between positive, contradictory
statements and mere negative statements. The Court added that "when a witness has
testified about some of the facts of a case the jury should know what else he has said
about it, so long as it is relevant to the merits of the case . . . ." Id. at 792.
11 Rule 63 (1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence declares the following to be a hearsay
exception:
Prior Statements of Witnesses. A prior statement of a witness, if the judge
finds that the witness had an adequate opportunity to perceive the event or
condition which his statement narrates, describes or explains, provided that
(a) it is inconsistent with his present testimony, or (b) it contains otherwise
admissible facts which the witness denies having stated or has forgotten
since making the statement ....
9 UTAH CODE ANN., RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 63 (1) (Supp. 1975).
0 Prior statements under oath, of course, would qualify under congressionally
enacted Rule 801(d)(1)(A). A case where the admissible prior inconsistent statement
was not given under oath was Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969).
There, the complaining witness denied having told the sheriff that the defendant was
"mistreating her sister on the bed." Id. at 789. The Court mentioned the argument that
the statement was not given under oath, but dismissed it with a quote from Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177,
192 (1948):
The courts declare the prior statement to be hearsay because it was not
made under oath, subject to the penalty for perjury or the test of cross-
examination. To which the answer might well be: "The declarant as a wit-
ness is now under oath and now purports to remember and narrate exactly.
The adversary can now expose every element that may carry a danger of
misleading the trier of fact both in the prgvious statement and in the present
testimony, and the trier can judge whether both the previous declaration and
the present testimony are reliable in whole or in part."
61 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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statements were made. The Court remarked:
The subsequent opportunity for cross-examination at trial
with respect to both present and past versions of the event,
is adequate to make equally admissible, as far as the Con-
frontation Clause is concerned, both the casual, off-hand
remark to a stranger, and the carefully recorded testimony at
a prior hearing. Here, however, Porter claimed at trial that
he could not remember the events that occurred after respon-
dent telephoned him and hence failed to give any current
version of the more important events described in his earlier
statement.
Whether Porter's apparent lapse of memory so affected
Green's right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference
in the application of the Confrontation Clause in this case is
an issue which is not ripe for decision at this juncture. The
state court did not focus on this precise question, which was
irrelevant given its broader and erroneous premise that an
out-of-court statement of a witness is inadmissible as sub-
stantive evidence, whatever the nature of the opportunity to
cross-examine at the trial."
On remand of the Green case, the California Supreme
Court held that the "prescribed purposes of the confrontation
clause" had been fulfilled even with respect to the out-of-court
prior statement which Porter had made.6" The extraordinary
factual situation, in which Porter had claimed that he did not
know if the statements were true but admitted making them,64
enabled the court to reach that conclusion. In the absence of
these unusual facts, however, lack of memory is likely to be
held to make "a critical difference in the application of the
Confrontation Clause."6 Thus, Weinstein and Berger are
probably accurately predicting the direction the decisions will
take when they warn: "Although the Supreme Court left the
matter open in Green, it would seem that the prior statement
should not be included under 801(d)(1)(A) if the judge finds
that the witness genuinely cannot remember, and the period of
11 Id. at 168-69.
e3 479 P.2d at 1003-04, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 499-500.
el Id. at 1003, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
c California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168 (1970).
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amnesia or forgetfulness is crucial as regards the facts in
issue.""
It appears to this writer, however, that the suggestion by
the United States Supreme Court in Green that lack of memory
could make a "critical difference" in the opportunity for cross-
examination merely highlights the basic error which the Court
made in Green. The Supreme Court felt that there were really
no hard choices which needed to be made with respect to the
use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence
because the right to cross-examine the alleged declarant con-
cerning his prior statement was an adequate substitute for con-
frontation at the time the statement was made. For reasons
which are set forth fully in Section VII of this article, it is
questionable whether the right to cross-examine the alleged
declarant about a prior inconsistent statement is of much value
at all to the opponent of the statement. If this is true, it does
not necessarily mean that the use of prior statements as sub-
stantive evidence should be excluded; but it does mean that a
real price-loss of the opportunity for meaningful confronta-
tion-will have to be paid. The Supreme Court suggested that
there can be no meaningful cross-examination at the point
where a witness sincerely cannot remember, and that the right
of confrontation must prevail under such circumstances. It is
this author's opinion, however, that the right to effective con-
frontation is sacrificed long before that point, even under the
congressional version of Rule 801(d) (1)(A).
C. Prior Inconsistent Statements as Inferior Evidence
The third aspect which must be considered with respect to
the meaning and effect of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not appear
in its language, which simply declares that all statements to
which the rule applies may be used as substantive evidence. In
response to complaints that Rule 801(d)(1)(A) might permit
convictions and judgments to be obtained solely on the basis
of evidence of prior inconsistent statements, advocates of the
federal rules have asserted that the critics were confusing
sufficiency and admissibility. Judge Weinstein gave that re-
11 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 53, at 801-86.
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joinder during a discussion of the proposed rules at a Judicial
Conference of the Second Circuit in 1969:
There are two parts to the question. One involves admis-
sibility and the answer is yes. The second is, will that evi-
dence alone sustain a conviction? In my view it will not.
Those are two questions. In considering the Rules of Evidence
keep them distinct.
One question, and that is the only one we are facing, is
what comes in. The general rules with respect to the responsi-
bility of the bench and of the jury is to insure that people are
not convicted in criminal cases on evidence which leaves a
reasonable doubt. In my opinion a conviction on the evidence
you presented in your hypothetical could not stand."
The Reporter for the Advisory Committee that drafted the
rules, Professor Edward W. Cleary, made a similar response to
objections that under the Supreme Court version even unsworn
prior inconsistent statements might support a conviction. In a
letter to the counsel of the House subcommittee redrafting the
rule, Professor Cleary wrote:
Apparently the premise that underlies the suggested re-
draft is that a statement not made under penalty of perjury
is an insufficient basis to support a conviction. The premise
confuses two distinct concepts: sufficiency and admissibility.
If every item of evidence admitted were required to be suffi-
cient to support a verdict, almost all circumstantial evidence,
for example, would be excluded. No one would argue that this
is so. Admittedly, if a judge were confronted with a situation,
under the rule as transmitted to the Congress, in which the
entire case for the prosecution was a prior inconsistent un-
sworn statement it would be difficult indeed to see how he
could avoid directing a verdict."
The idea also appears as part of the legislative history of
the rules in the form of a footnote to the Senate Committee
report which states:
" JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, SECOND JUDICIAL CiRcurr, A DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 48 F.R.D. 39, 65 (1969).
11 Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Re-
form of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., Ser. 2, Supp. at 98-99 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]. See also
Hearings on Federal Rules of Evidence before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 51-52 (1974).
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It would appear that some of the opposition to this Rule
is based on a concern that a person could be convicted solely
upon evidence admissible under this Rule. The Rule, how-
ever, is not addressed to the question of the sufficiency of
evidence to send a case to the jury, but merely as to its admis-
sibility. Factual circumstances could well arise where, if this
were the sole evidence, dismissal would be appropriate."
Weinstein and Berger cite the above footnote to support their
conclusion that: "It is doubtful. . . that in any but the most
unusual case, a prior inconsistent statement alone will suffice
to support a conviction since it is unlikely that a reasonable
juror could be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by such
evidence alone."7
Thus, there is substantial authority to support the argu-
ment that a conviction supported only by prior inconsistent
statements should not be allowed to stand. The rule itself,
however, does not announce this limitation, and not everyone
agrees that the limitation exists. For example, at the same 1969
conference at which Judge Weinstein drew the distinction be-
tween sufficiency and admissibility, Professor Fleming James,
Jr., responded to the question of whether a conviction could be
based upon a repudiated prior statement: "That is as I under-
stand the rules."
'7'
The sufficiency limitation may exist without regard to any
implication from the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, if it
is constitutionally compelled. Footnote 15 to the Supreme
Court's opinion in California v. Green suggests a constitutional
basis for such a limitation. That footnote states in part:
While we may agree that considerations of due process,
wholly apart from the Confrontation Clause, might prevent
convictions where a reliable evidentiary basis is totally lack-
ing, we do not read Bridges as declaring that the Constitution
is necessarily violated by the admission of a witness' prior
inconsistent statement for the truth of the matter asserted.72
19 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 n.21.
70 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 53, at 801-73.
7. 48 F.R.D. at 65.
72 399 U.S. at 163-64 n.15. See also 399 U.S. at 186 n.20, 189 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
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The major problem with this supposed limitation on Rule
801(d)(1) (A) is not whether the limitation exists, but rather it
is the absence of any standards for determining when the limi-
tation should be applied, if indeed it does exist. None of the
advocates of the rule state that the limitation will automati-
cally prevent a conviction (or judgment) from ever being based
solely upon a prior inconsistent statement, and the absence of
such a standard allows the courts to apply the limitation at
their discretion. The record of the courts in that regard is not
encouraging. In Green the United States Supreme Court noted
that there was a "not insubstantial" issue as to whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction." It stated that
the conviction rested "almost entirely on the evidence in Por-
ter's two prior statements which were themselves inconsistent
in some respects. ' 4 Therefore, it would seem that this was an
appropriate case in which to apply the sufficiency limitation.
On remand, however, the Supreme Court of California dis-
posed of the high Court's concern by declaring:
The evidence is not insufficient as a matter of law to support
the finding of guilt: despite certain inconsistencies between
Porter's preliminary hearing testimony and his declaration to
Officer Wade, both statements unequivocally identify defen-
dant as his supplier of marijuana. Far from being themselves
inherently incredible, the statements depict, as characterized
by the Attorney General, "a dismally common story" of the
exploitation of youth for the purpose of peddling contraband
drugs. Even discounting Porter's low level of credibility, the
trial court could properly conclude from all the evidence that
"I am satisfied myself that Porter dealt with (defendant),
used it (i.e., marijuana), and sold it . . ."I'
If the California decision in Green is typical of future
cases, the limitation means that a judge should not allow a jury
to convict only if he does not believe the prior inconsistent
statements to be true, 7 and this provides no real protection
399 U.S. at 170 n.19.
74 Id.
73 479 P.2d at 1004, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
16 This is apparently the effect which Mr. Justice Harlan gave to it in footnote 20
of his concurring opinion in California v. Green, which states, in part:
By the same token I would not permit a conviction to stand where the
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against convictions based solely upon prior inconsistent state-
ments. It is hoped that the courts will adopt and apply the
limitation so that only in the most unusual circumstances
would they fail to direct a verdict when essential elements of
the case are proven only by prior inconsistent statements.
IV. IMPEACHMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Federal Evidence Rule 607 provides: "The credibility of a
witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling him." Therefore it is clearly proper under the new fed-
eral rules for either party to attack the credibility of a witness,
and there is no longer any need for parties to resort to such
devices as claims of surprise, or purported attempts to "refresh
the memory" of a witness who now remembers a different
story,77 if the purpose of the impeachment really is to discredit
the witness. Purported impeachment, however, has long been
used as a device to inform the fact finder of otherwise inadmis-
sible facts. Under the federal hearsay system, of course, this
critical issues at trial were supported only by ex parte testimony not sub-
jected to cross-examination, and not found to be reliable by the trial judge.
It will, of course, be the unusual situation where the prosecution's entire case
is built upon hearsay testimony of an unavailable witness. In such circum-
stance the defendant would be entitled to a hearing on the reliability of the
testimony.
399 U.S. at 186 n.20 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also id. at 189 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
11 Weinstein and Berger state:
[Flederal practice will not be revolutionized since a large number of modifi-
cations had been developed under previous practice to side-step the impact
of the traditional rule. Now that the rule has finally been abrogated, it seems
pointless to devote much more space to perpetuate these exceptions which
had been the subject of countless pages of now obsolete discussion. As a
matter of historical interest, it suffices to note that in the federal system the
consequence of a non-impeachment rule had been cushioned by allowing
impeachment of the witness in the following situations: where his testimony
surprised the party calling him and was harmful to his case, by having the
judge call the witness, by allowing the impeachment of compulsory wit-
nesses, adverse parties in civil cases, government agents called by defendants
in criminal cases in the Second Circuit, witnesses in civil cases by their
depositions, by permitting a party limited scope to bring out damaging mat-
ter about a witness on direct examination, by allowing the accuracy of the
testimony to be contradicted by extrinsic evidence, and by getting the im-
peaching evidence before the jury in the guise of refreshing the witness'
recollection.
3 WEINSTEI's EVIDENCE, supra note 53, 607-13 to 607-14 (footnotes omitted).
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use of prior statements becomes even more important because
those which fall within the limits of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) can be
used as substantive evidence to prove a case.
The federal rules of evidence drafted by the Advisory Com-
mittee and approved by the Supreme Court would have re-
solved all questions concerning the use of purported impeach-
ment by making prior inconsistent statements proper for any
purpose." This draft clearly assumed that such statements
would be freely admissible under Rule 801(d)(1) (A) in order to
"provide a party with desirable protection against the 'turn-
coat' witness who changes his story on the stand and deprives
the party calling him of evidence essential to his case."79 The
federal system would therefore have worked just as the Califor-
nia Law Revision Commission expected the similar California
Evidence Code provisions to perform:
Because Section 1235 permits a witness' inconsistent
statements to be considered as evidence of the matters stated
and not merely as evidence casting discredit on the witness,
it follows that a party may introduce evidence of inconsistent
statements of his own witness whether or not the witness gave
damaging testimony and whether or not the party was sur-
prised by the testimony, for such evidence is no longer irrele-
vant (and, hence, inadmissible)."
But Rule 801(d) (1) (A) was not adopted by Congress in the
form proposed by the draftsmen. Since the version of Rule
801(d)(1) (A) adopted by Congress declares only some prior in-
consistent statements to be "not hearsay," it should be possible
in the other situations to prevent a witness from being called
to the stand merely to permit the jury to hear, as impeach-
ment, his prior statements. Even though it is no longer possible
to object that the party is impeaching his own witness," it is
still proper to object that the value of the impeachment to the
impeaching party is outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the
opponent of the prior inconsistent statements which would oth-
R See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 4, at 293.
7' Id. at 296, quoting CALIFORNA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Recommendation Pro-
posing an Evidence Code 234 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION
COIIMISSION].
' CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 79, at 233.
" See FED. R. EVID. 607.
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erwise be excluded as hearsay. Such an objection is validated
by Federal Evidence Rule 403, which specifically authorizes
the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by its danger. Of course, if Rule 403 is
used to prevent impeachment with prior inconsistent state-
ments which are not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1) (A), it can
be expected that attorneys will continue to use the traditional
devices to reveal the existence of such prior inconsistent state-
ments.
8 2
V. SUBSTANTIVE USE OF PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a prior consistent state-
ment by a witness who testifies at a trial and is subject to cross-
examination is "not hearsay" if the statement "is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabri-
cation or improper influence or motive." By making such state-
ments nonhearsay, the rule allows the introduction of these
statements as substantive evidence of the truth of what is
therein expressed. The traditional rule has been that prior con-
sistent statements could be admitted in evidence only if the
fact that they were said served some nonhearsay purpose, such
as proving an act inconsistent with a claim of fabrication or
improper influence.83 The federal rule does not change the tra-
ditional requirement that a prior consistent statement must
serve a nonhearsay purpose in order to be admissible; it simply
permits the additional use of these statements substantively,
as proof of the truth of their contents.
One wonders if this rule really serves any meaningful pur-
pose. Because the substance of the prior statement has already
been given through the witness' in-court testimony, the prior
statement does not really add to the substantive evidence
available to the fact finder. In reality, it will be used only for
the traditional purpose of aiding the fact finder in deciding
whether or not to believe the substance of the two statements.
The rule would permit a fact finder to base a decision on a vital
fact which appeared to be proved only by a prior statement
covered by the rule only if counsel had inadvertently failed to
' See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
See generally MCCORMICK § 251.
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bring out that fact during in-court examination or if the fact
finder failed to remember that the vital fact had been brought
out during in-court examination. Such opportunities to ac-
tually apply the rule are likely to be extremely rare.
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is based upon § 1236 of the California
Evidence Code, and that section does not appear to have had
any practical effect in any of the cases in which it has been
cited. 4 Even when that statute was held to be unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court of California,8 the error caused by fol-
lowing the statute was found to be harmless. 6 It is therefore not
surprising that the congressional amendments restricting
801(d)(1)(A) were not added to 801(d)(1)(B).
The only explanation for the draftsmen's decision to follow
the California Rules of Evidence concerning prior consistent
statements appears to be a desire to put an end to the problem
of attempting to explain to a jury the "subtle distinction" be-
tween prior statements and substantive evidence in this in-
stance.87 If Rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 801(d)(1)(B) had been
adopted in the form proposed by the Advisory Committee and
approved by the Supreme Court, they might well have elimi-
nated that problem. It would have been possible to instruct a
jury with respect to all prior statements without distinguishing
between those that could be used to support a verdict and those
that could not.
But Rule 801(d)(1)(A) was amended to make only prior
' See, e.g., People v. Cannady, 503 P.2d 585, 105 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1972); People v.
Gentry, 76 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Ct. App. 1969); People v. Hernandez, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Ct.
App. 1968).
People v. Washington, 458 P.2d 479, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969).
' Id. at 488, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
'7 The Advisory Committee's note on 801(d)(1)(B) does not suggest that any bene-
fit will be gained by adoption of that section. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 4, at
296 (Advisory Committee's note). But the Advisory Committee was following the sys-
tem used by the California Law Revision Commission which had justified giving sub-
stantive effect to a prior consistent statement with this argument:
Section 1236, however, permits a prior consistent statement of a witness
to be used as substantive evidence if the statement is otherwise admissible
under the rules relating to the rehabilitation of impeached witness ...
There is no reason to perpetuate the subtle distinction made in the
cases. It is not realistic to expect a jury to understand that it cannot believe
that a witness was telling the truth on a former occasion even though it
believes that the same story given at the hearing is true.
CALIFORNIA LAw REVISIoN COMMISSION, supra note 79, at 234 (citation omitted).
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inconsistent statements "given under oath subject to the pen-
alty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition" admissible as substantive evidence. Thus, even
though all prior consistent statements which are admissible
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will be substantive evidence, many
prior inconsistent statements which will come into evidence in
the traditional manner will not be. The problem of differentiat-
ing the two uses to the jury, then, has not been eliminated.
Seemingly, no harm will result if the jury either actually under-
stands or completely ignores what it is told. But substantial
harm may result if the jury tries to apply an instruction that
prior consistent statements are substantive evidence by inter-
preting the instruction to mean that prior consistent state-
ments are to be given extra weight. This possible misunder-
standing stems from the fact that there is almost no proper use
to which the jury can put the judge's instruction that prior
consistent statements are substantive evidence.
If no purpose is served by informing the jury of the sub-
stantive use of prior consistent statements, the jury should not
be told. A more complete solution, however, would be for other
states to follow Maine's decision to reject 801(d)(1)(B) alto-
gether. Maine Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if ... the declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination con-
cerning the statement, and the statement is inconsistent with
his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the pen-
alty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding, or in a
deposition. A prior consistent statement by the declarant,
whether or not under oath, is admissible only to rebut an
express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive."8
I 2 Maine Leg. Serv. 573 (1975). The Adviser's Note to this Maine rule states:
The concluding sentence limiting a prior consistent statement, whether
or not under oath, to use in rebuttal of a claim of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive states the present Maine law. Although proba-
bly unnecessary, it is included here for the sake of clarity. One reason for
including it is to emphasize the difference from the Federal Rule, which
makes a prior consistent statement substantive evidence.
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, MAINE RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 50 (1975).
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VI. THE EFFECT OF SUBSTANTIVE USE OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS ON FORUM SHOPPING
Our system of parallel federal and state courts constantly
presents the problem of whether federal courts must conform
to the rules which are applied in state courts. The Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence took the position that
Erie9 and its progeny posed problems only with respect to their
proposed rules on presumptions. That hurdle was cleared by
creating a rule under which federal courts are to look to state
law for the effect of presumptions when the claim or defense is
one "as to which state law supplies the rule of decision."91
Thus, only in the area of presumptions, and in two other lim-
ited situations,92 will there necessarily be consistency between
state and federal rules of evidence, unless and until states
adopt the substance of the federal rules as their own.
Major differences between the evidentiary rules of parallel
state and federal courts will undoubtedly create serious prob-
lems. If attorneys can predict a difference in outcome due to
conflicting rules, forum shopping will result. Even if attorneys
cannot predict well enough to make forum shopping profitable,
there are other repercussions of parallel court systems deciding
the same case by different rules. These include the displace-
ment of state regulation,93 inconsistent results in similar cases,
and a heavy burden on attorneys who practice in the two sys-
tems.94
The draftsmen and advocates of the federal rules were not
unaware of these dangers, but considered them part of the price
to be paid for a badly needed change. Judge Weinstein ana-
lyzed the conflicting factors between the pressure for uniform
and improved federal evidence rules and deference for state
law.9" He suggested that the necessary compromise might be
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
" PROPOSED RULES, supra note 4, at 211 (Advisory Committee's note).
9' Id. The author will refer to this type of rule generally as a "mini-Erie" rule.
9 There are two other instances of the application of "mini-Erie" rules in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. These were added by Congress and will be discussed infra.
" See Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 353, 363-73 (1969).
" See Weinberg, Choice of Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: New
Perspectives, 122 U. PENN. L. REv. 594, 614-18 (1974).
1 Weinstein, supra note 93.
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achieved by giving greater weight to state evidentiary rules
which reflected important state policies96 or were closely asso-
ciated with particular substantive rights97 and less weight to
state evidentiary rules that merely represented a disagreement
between the opinions of state and federal draftsmen as to how
the truth might best be ascertained. The Advisory Committee's
application of a "mini-Erie" rule to certain presumptions was
a limited attempt to strike the desired balance. Weinstein con-
ceded, however, that his approach merely lessened rather than
ended the conflicts:
Yet, even as to truth-determining rules, it must be con-
ceded that any liberalization of a general rule of evidence
may affect the outcome of a case or even of classes of
cases ...
Such ephemeral factors must be ignored if the federal
courts are to operate as an independent system with an integ-
rity of its own. An independent and respected system of fed-
eral courts is desirable as a matter of federal policy, among
other reasons, to enforce federal rights and to dignify the
independent federal nation. Thus, while the "nature of the
tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of the
parcel of rights behind a cause of action" at least some of the
differences must be ignored in our dual system of sover-
eignty.
98
Congress, especially the House of Representatives, demon-
strated more concern for the twin dangers of forum shopping
and interference with state laws than the draftsmen of the
Supreme Court version of the federal rules by the addition of
two other "mini-Erie" rules.99 An elaborate set of rules for priv-
ileges' 0 was replaced by this final version of Rule 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory author-
ity, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or
9S Id. at 370-73.
Id. at 363-70.
" Id. at 362-63.
120 CONG. REc. H549 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
'9 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 4, at 230-61 (Advisory Committee's note).
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political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be determined in accordance with State law. 01
Similar problems with federal rules relating to the competency
of witnesses0 2 were solved with another "mini-Erie" provision,
Rule 601: "Every person is competent to be a witness except
as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or de-
fense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance
with State law."'
0 3
,"I The House Committee explained the reasons for this "mini-Erie" rule as fol-
lows:
The rationale underlying the proviso is that federal law should not su-
persede that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a
compelling reason. The Committee believes that in civil cases in the federal
courts where an element of a claim or defense is not grounded upon a federal
question, there is no federal interest strong enough to justify departure from
State policy. In addition, the Committee considered that the Court's pro-
posed Article V would have promoted forum shopping in some civil actions,
depending upon differences in the privilege law applied as among the State
and federal courts. The Committee's proviso, on the other hand, under which
the federal courts are bound to apply the State's privilege law in actions
founded upon a State-created right or defense, removes the incentive to
"shop."
HOUSE COMmI-rEE REPORT, supra note 33, at 9.
"2 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 4, at 261-81 (Advisory Committee's note). The
proposed rules on competency would have eliminated such state devices as the Dead
Man's Acts. Id. at 262.
113 With respect to this rule the House Committee stated:
Rule 601 as submitted to the Congress provided that "Every person is
competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." One
effect of the Rule as proposed would have been to abolish age, mental capac-
ity, and other grounds recognized in some State jurisdictions as making a
person incompetent as a witness. The greatest controversy centered around
the Rule's rendering inapplicable in the federal courts the so-called Dead
Man's Statutes which exist in some States. Acknowledging that there is
substantial disagreement as to the merit of Dead Man's Statutes, the Com-
mittee nevertheless believed that where such statutes have been enacted
they represent State policy which should not be overturned in the absence
of a compelling federal interest. The Committee therefore amended the Rule
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The two "mini-Erie" rules added by Congress will have the
practical effect of greatly reducing the opportunities for forum
shopping. In the common situation where a diversity case in-
volves only claims and defenses controlled by state law, the
state rules on privileges and competency will apply, regardless
of whether the action is brought in state court or in the corre-
sponding federal court. The "mini-Erie" rules do not affect,
however, the opportunities for forum shopping in cases where
the claims and defenses are controlled by federal law. When
those actions are litigated in federal courts, they will be subject
to the Federal Rules of Evidence; when they are tried in state
courts, state evidence rules will apply.' 4
The "mini-Erie" rules will also create some opportunities
for confusion and even for intracourt forum shopping within
the confines of a single case in a single district court. Those
parties who have a case which can be brought in a federal court
on either state or federal law grounds, or both, will also have a
choice as to which evidence rules will control privileges and
competency.
The significance of forum shopping opportunities depends
on the likelihood of different results obtaining from the appli-
cation of dissimilar rules. Experienced trial attorneys with
whom the author has discussed the problem have suggested
that individual evidentiary rules may not be that important.
They generally suggest that the decision of where to file or
whether to remove takes place early in the development of a
case, at which time it is difficult to predict what evidentiary
issues will be significant at the time of trial. Evidentiary con-
siderations are among a myriad of factors that must be consid-
ered in forum choice, and, in the past, have not been an over-
riding concern.' 5 But the Federal Rules of Evidence may be
creating a new era in which the differences between the eviden-
tiary rules in particular courts are going to be clearer and more
important.
to make competency in civil actions determinable in accordance with State
law with respect to elements of claims or defenses as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision.
HOUSE CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 33, at 9.
101 But see Weinstein, supra note 93, at 375.
See Summers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum In Diversity
Cases, 47 IowA L. REv. 933 (1962).
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From 1938 to 197506 the use of evidence in civil cases in
federal courts was controlled by Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 43(a), which provided in part:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under
the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evi-
dence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on
the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence
applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in
which the United States court is held. In any case, the statute
or rule which favors the reception of the evidence govern and
the evidence shall be presented according to the most conven-
ient method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which
reference is herein made. The competency of a witness to
testify shall be determined in like manner.
This rule provided precious little guidance to judges. It should
not be surprising, therefore, that the actual evidence practice
in federal trial courts has frequently resembled the procedure
in the state trial courts from which judge and counsel come.' 7
Judge Weinstein suggested that these practices would continue
even under a system of federal evidence rules:
The court, in exercising its discretion, will tend to be
influenced by the state rules with which it is familiar. The
knowledge and tradition of the individual lawyer, who will
continue to follow the same practice and much the same
forms wherever possible, reduces the shock of reform. Thus,
for example, although substantial departures from code
pleadings were incorporated in federal rules, many federal
pleadings still look as if they were drawn for the state courts.
Years after the elimination of the need to take an exception
to a ruling on evidence, the word "exception" is still regularly
flung into the teeth of federal judges by lawyers outraged by
"I' See Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 622, 623-41 (1936), for a description of the even more confused
situation which existed prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
"I CoMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF
DEVELOPING UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, 30
F.R.D. 73, 97 (1962) [hereinafter cited as COMMrITTEE ON RULES], quoting MORGAN,
MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 258 (4th ed. 1957). The Committee noted:
"Cases in the federal courts are also badly confused, no doubt in part because many
federal judges, each steeped in a local state practice before appointment, carried along
their established habits; nor is the local bar without influence in this respect." Id.
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the court's rulings. Within the courtroom the lawyer's prepa-
ration and his almost involuntary reflexive action in object-
ing and phrasing his questions and in proffering evidence will
not be radically and immediately affected, whatever the new
rule.' 8
To the extent, however, that the changes and differences
in rules are clearly spelled out and give important rights to one
party or another, as do the hearsay provisions, they will be used
to change the practices in the federal courts. Congresswoman
Elizabeth Holtzman thought that the federal hearsay rules in-
vited forum shopping:
Another thorny problem this codification will produce is
forum shopping. Because this code substantially liberalizes
the hearsay rules, federal courts may become a more attrac-
tive forum for litigation. This is not, however, a time to in-
crease the work load of the already congested federal courts.
Nor is there any substantial justification on a hearsay issue
for a different outcome in a federal court when state law is
involved. ' 9
The House Committee Report itself acknowledged that one
new rule invited forum shopping:
The Committee did not consider dying declarations as
among the most reliable forms of hearsay. Consequently, it
amended the provision to limit their admissibility in criminal
cases to homicide prosecutions, where exceptional need for
the evidence is present. This is existing law. At the same
time, the Committee approved the expansion to civil actions
and proceedings where the stakes do not involve possible
imprisonment, although noting that this could lead to forum
shopping in some instances."'
If the Federal Rules of Evidence do in fact create new and
important differences between practices in state courts and
'" Weinstein, supra note 93, at 359-60. Rule 43(a) now reads:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court,
unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (1975).
,0 House CoMMrTTEE REPORT, supra note 33, at 27 (Separate Views of Hon. Eliza-
beth Holtzman).
"I Id. at 15-16.
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federal courts, attorneys may be under an ethical obligation to
discover how these differences affect their cases before they file
or remove them. Professor Wright is correct when he states:
When there is a legitimate choice between a state and a
federal forum for a particular action, the lawyer who has the
choice quite properly will weigh what he conceives to be the
tactical advantages and disadvantages of going to one court
or the other ....
If a choice of forum exists, there is nothing improper in
taking such tactical considerations as those mentioned into
account in making that choice."'
The major action taken by Congress to reduce forum shop-
ping opportunities, though Congress apparently took the action
for other reasons, was to restrict the substantive use of prior
inconsistent statements. There is, therefore, an important
forum shopping problem involved in the question of whether or
not the Supreme Court version of Rule 801(d)(1) (A) should be
restored. Almost any federal evidence rule which is to be ap-
plied throughout the nation will create some opportunities for
forum shopping because of the differences in practices from
state to state. Neither version of Rule 801(d)(1) (A) lessens the
problem, however, for each creates a major forum shopping
problem. Eleven states, the Virgin Islands and the Canal Zone
permit, by statute, rule, or decision, substantive use of all prior
inconsistent statements of a witness who is available for cross-
examination." 2 Three of these states, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Wisconsin, have achieved that result by adopting rules of
evidence based upon the Supreme Court or earlier version of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under Civil Rule 43(a), which
controlled evidence practice in civil cases prior to the adoption
of the federal rules, state rules providing for more liberal ad-
mission of evidence would have also been applied in federal
"' C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 99 (2d ed. 1970).
", See Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alas. 1971); State v. Skinner, 515 P.2d 880
(Ariz. 1973); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1969); State v. Igoe, 206
N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973); CAL. EviD. CODE § 1235 (West 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
460(a) (1964); NEV. REv. STAT. § 51.035(2)(a) (1973); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:84A (Supp.
1974), N.J.R. Evm. § 63(1)(a)(Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-801 (Supp. 1973),
N.M.R. Evm. Rule 801(d)(1)(A)(1973); UTAH R. Evm. § 63(1)(a)(Supp. 1975); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 908.01(4)(a)(1)(1975); C.Z. CODE tit. 5, § 2962(1) (1963); V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 5, § 932(1) (1967).
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courts sitting in those states.13 But the new federal rules do not
permit such use of state rules. Thus, in these 13 jurisdictions
it is likely that parties will remove to the federal courts in order
to avoid substantive use of prior inconsistent statements.
Thirty-eight states continue to apply the orthodox doc-
trine forbidding substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements. The remaining state, Maine, has adopted rules of
evidence effective February 2, 1976, which are based upon the
congressional version of the federal rules, and which specifi-
cally include the congressional restriction of Rule
801(d)(1)(A). I 14 The 801(d)(1)(A) restrictions were also fol-
lowed in a new revision of the Uniform Rules of Evidence based
upon the Federal Rules of Evidence."' If more states adopt
rules of evidence modeled after the federal rules or the Uniform
Rules of Evidence (1974), which seems extremely likely,"6 they
will probably adopt the federal version of 801(d)(1) (A). There-
fore, the form of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) in effect in the federal
courts during the next few years will probably have a major
impact on the form of future state evidentiary rules.
In these circumstances, some advocates of the Federal
Rules of Evidence may have felt that conflicts between federal
and state provisions which produce forum shopping would ac-
tually be desirable if they led to adoption of the superior federal
rules by the states. One of the purposes for the creation of the
federal rules was a belief that rules of evidence in use through-
out the nation were in great need of improvement. '1 7 Advocates
of the new federal rules expect them to serve as a model for the
states in much the same manner as have the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Professor Edward W. Cleary, the Reporter for
the Advisory Committee which prepared the Supreme Court
draft of the federal evidence rules, stated in his testimony be-
fore the House subcommittee:
There has been a very marked interest in the States in the
progress of the rules from the very inception of this project.
,,3 See text accompanying note 108 supra.
" See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
"J UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(A)(1974).
,, See text accompanying notes 118 and 119 infra.
,, See CoMMrITEE ON RULES, supra note 107, at 108. But see Weinberg, supra note
94, at 606-09.
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And we anticipate, I think with reason, that the impact of a
set of Federal rules, whether they are these rules or another
set, would be substantially the same as the Federal civil rules
with regard to State practice.
I learned in the last few days that the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws have appointed a special committee to
examine into the changes which might be necessary in these
rules for State use. And that committee had a meeting, I
think, in St. Louis in the early part of January. I am now in
correspondence with them."8
Frank J. Jestrab, who served as Chairman of the Special Com-
mittee on Rules of Evidence of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, told the House Sub-
committee:
I think in certain areas of the law, and indeed of human
experience, a certain time comes when, finally, there is ac-
tion. I think we are in that particular time with respect to
rules of evidence now. I am told that within the calendar year
1973, three or four States, additional States, in addition to
the two or three that I mentioned, are going to adopt or be
working on rules of evidence.
I think that within the next 4 or 5 years we might see 25
or 30 States enacting or adopting, depending on how they do
it, whether it is by rule or by statute, a code of evidence. And
I think that unless there is some model, some uniform rules
to go by, you are going to have all of the diversities that we
now have wrapped up in individual evidence codes in the
States, and they are going to be exceedingly hard to change."9
Under these circumstances, advocates of the Federal Rules
of Evidence could argue that even a substantial forum shop-
ping problem might be just a temporary stage in a course of
events that would lead to a nationwide evidence reformation.
Whether it would be proper for the federal courts to adopt an
improved evidence code, despite its forum shopping effects, or
in order to create pressure on the states to adopt the same
reforms, raises all the unresolved problems of the Swift v.
"' 1973 Hearings, supra note 68, at 34-35.
112 Id. at 356-57.
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Tyson,'20 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins'"' dispute. Whatever one's
judgment of this general argument, however, its application to
general substantive use of prior inconsistent statements de-
pends upon whether or not that change is really an improve-
ment in the law of evidence.
VII. CHANGING THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE TO PERMIT
SUBSTANTIVE USE OF ALL PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
The most important change in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence which might be proposed in the near future would be the
removal of the congressional restriction on the scope of Rule
801(d)(1)(A) and the readoption of the Supreme Court version
of that rule so that all prior inconsistent statements would be
admissible as substantive evidence. As enacted, Rule
801(d)(1)(A) was a disappointment to many of those who had
worked for the adoption of federal rules of evidence. Wein-
stein's and Berger's judgment is that "[a]s amended, Rule 801
is hardly even innovative; it is, regrettably, less useful in elicit-
ing truth than the Supreme Court's draft of the rule would have
been."'22 In a critique of the House version of the rules, Moore
and Bendix were harsher in describing the similar House re-
strictions: "This amendment almost destroys the usefulness of
the provision."' The version of the Federal Rules of Evidence
passed by the Senate actually restored the Supreme Court ver-
sion of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 24 but the conference report adopted
the present restrictions as a compromise. 21
The major question to be considered in deciding if the
Supreme Court version should be restored is whether the
chances of reaching correct results will be improved by treating
as substantive evidence the kinds of prior inconsistent state-
ments which are excluded by the congressional restrictions on
Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
There are two primary arguments advanced in support of
12 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
121 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
122 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 53, 801-71.
"I Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulernaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9, 31
(1974).
124 S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 27.
12 H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
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substantive use of all prior inconsistent statements. The first
is that because the jury learns of prior inconsistent statements
when they are introduced to impeach credibility, it is mere
hypocrisy to call them nonsubstantive and instruct the jury not
to decide the case on the basis of such statements. The second
argument is that if the declarant of the alleged prior inconsist-
ent statement is available in court for examination, the re-
quirements of the rule against the use of hearsay are satisfied.
It appears to this writer that both of these arguments fail to
recognize that there will be a price exacted for the substantive
use of prior inconsistent statements. That price-the inability
to effectively respond to and attack this kind of evidence-
would be paid by the parties against whom such prior incon-
sistent statements are used.
A third argument that is made for the substantive use of
prior inconsistent statements is somewhat vague and difficult
to articulate. While admitting that a price may be paid for
substantive use, supporters argue that the increase in evidence
thus available for consideration outweighs the possible costs.
This is obviously a value judgment, and one with which the
author disagrees.
Moore and Bendix state the first argument in their critique
of the House restrictions on Rule 801(d)(1)(A): "[The rule]
asks the jury essentially to do the impossible by using a state-
ment for impeachment but not for its substantive truth. Mr.
Justice Cardozo long ago criticized such rules of law that re-
quire 'discrimination so subtle' and 'beyond the compass of
ordinary minds.' ""26 While it is certainly true that it would be
hard for the jury to understand and apply an instruction that
a particular item of evidence is not to be treated as substantive
evidence, it should also be pointed out that the jury is ex-
tremely unlikely to reach a result that violates the instruction
in any meaningful way, regardless of whether they understand
the instruction or not.
If counsel and the trial judge have properly performed
their duties, a case will not be submitted to the jury unless
there is substantive evidence in the record to support every
25 Moore & Bendix, supra note 123.
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
essential element. In the overwhelming majority of cases, a jury
which actually considers the evidence on those essential points
will decide to believe the evidence which we have called
substantive. With respect to its decision to believe or not be-
lieve the substantive evidence, the only use which the jury can
logically make of the prior inconsistent and consistent state-
ments is the proper one of aiding it in deciding which substan-
tive evidence to credit. The fact that the jury may well believe
that the prior statements are also true is beside the point, if the
jury does in fact decide to believe enough substantive evidence
to find for the party for whom it returns a verdict. The fact that
the jury may give great weight to a prior statement is in no way
improper, if there is substantive evidence which the jury
decides to believe.
With the exercise of some ingenuity a few situations can
be invented whereby the jury could violate an instruction not
to use nonsubstantive evidence in a manner which would affect
the result in a case. But this supposes a jury that believed a
prior inconsistent statement but decided not to credit any of
the substantive evidence on that same point, or forgot all the
substantive evidence on that point, or simply refused to think
about it. This last possibility suggests a much more likely prob-
lem-the jury may ignore much or even all of the evidence. But
that is not a problem which can be controlled by instructions
on the difference between substantive and nonsubstantive evi-
dence.
Thus, the question of whether a particular piece of evi-
dence is called "substantive" is not an important one if the
trial judge properly understands and applies the rules requiring
that there be substantive evidence to support every essential
element of the case. It is not necessary, then, to adopt a rule
for prior statements which can be best understood by the jury;
this frees rulemakers to structure a provision best suited to the
search for truth.
The second argument made in support of substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements is that the party against whom
the statement is offered as evidence is adequately protected if
he has an opportunity to question the alleged declarant about
the statement during the trial at which the statement is of-
fered. It is customary in discussions of this topic to refer to the
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examination of the declarant by the party against whom the
statement is offered as "cross-examination." As was pointed
out earlier,' 7 the party against whom the statement is offered
may not be entitled to conduct a cross-examination of that
witness under ordinary procedural rules. The courts, of course,
can satisfy the literal requirements of Rule 801(d) (1) (A) if they
infer that the rule authorizes the cross-examination it requires.
If they do not, however, the effect will be that only those parties
who call the declarant themselves, and thereby give the oppos-
ing party the right to cross-examination, will be able to use the
statements substantively.
Perhaps one ought to question why the party who is sup-
posed to be protected by this cross-examination may have no
right to conduct such a cross-examination under ordinary trial
rules.
Wigmore, 2M McCormick,' 29 Morgan,1 3 and Maguire'3 ' all
endorsed general substantive use of prior inconsistent state-
ments. Wigmore argued:
[T]he theory of the hearsay rule is that an extrajudicial
statement is rejected because it was made out of court by an
absent person not subject to cross-examination . . . Here,
however, by hypothesis the witness is present and subject to
cross-examination. There is ample opportunity to test him as
to the basis for his former statement. The whole purpose of
the hearsay rule has been already satisfied. Hence there is
nothing to prevent the tribunal from giving such testimonial
credit to the extrajudicial statement as it may seem to de-
serve.'
3 2
The fact that Congress chose to restrict the application of
Rule 801(d)(1) (A) despite the impressive scholarly support for
general substantive use of prior inconsistent statements can be
explained by the fact that the trial bar has generally rejected
the scholars' theories on this point. Weinstein and Berger state:
I" See part HI A, supra.
,z 3A WIGMORE § 1018.
in MCCORMICK § 251.
"- Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177, 192-96 (1948).
3I Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 741, 767-68 (1961).
"I 3A WIGMORE § 1018, at 996.
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In deference to these objections of practical trial lawyers
to whom, in the words of Professor Maguire, the analysis of
prior statements as non-hearsay appears as "a professorial
pipe-dream," Rule 801 was amended to limit the number of
situations in which prior statements of a witness would be
given substantive effect.'33
From the trial lawyer's viewpoint, there are two major objec-
tions to the theory that an opportunity during the trial to cross-
examine the alleged declarant of the prior inconsistent state-
ment is an adequate substitute for the protection provided by
the hearsay rule. The first is that the most the theory purports
to provide is an opportunity for cross-examination at trial,
while the insistence on in-court testimony also protects the
right to require direct examination. Secondly, trial lawyers
argue that an opportunity to cross-examine at trial is not an
adequate substitute for an opportunity to cross-examine at
the time the statement was allegedly given.
Normally, when it is said that a party has a right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him, this means that he has a
right to require that they appear in court and testify in accord-
ance with the usual rules. Those rules include cross-
examination but they also include a set of rules concerning
leading questions, and the like, which are designed to ensure
that the witness' testimony is actually what the witness himself
remembers and what the witness himself intends to say. Al-
though the right to require strict compliance with the rules
concerning direct examination is one that parties frequently
waive, it is also one that can be very valuable if there is any
doubt as to whether a witness intends to say what examining
counsel would have him say. It would appear to be a particu-
larly valuable right with respect to the class of statements ex-
cluded from substantive use by the congressional restrictions.
The most important group of statements excluded by the con-
gressional restrictions are the large number of signed written
statements taken by public and private investigators. Although
the fact that the statements are in writing would appear to
solve the problem of whether we have a correct report of the
out-of-court statement, the process by which such statements
"1' 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 53, at 801-69.
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are obtained is the antithesis of the process of direct examina-
tion. Written statements ordinarily are composed by the inves-
tigator and the witness' signature parallels the problem pre-
sented by a witness' acquiescence to a leading question in the
courtroom.'34
The advocates of general substantive use of prior inconsist-
ent statements may respond that the witness can explain any
mistake made in signing the statement when cross-examined
by the party against whom the statement is offered. But no
amount of repudiation by the witness can undo the earlier
statement. If the witness admits making the statement, or the
jury decides to believe other evidence that he did so, the jury
is free to believe the earlier statement. This is a desirable result
if one believes that most witnesses who contradict out-of-court
statements do so for fear or favor. But it is not a desirable result
if one believes that out-of-court statements may have been
obtained by leading or misleading the witness. Of course, the
jury will do its best to decide whether the out-of-court version
is true, but the general ban on hearsay is based upon a belief
that this is not protection enough.
The second objection, that cross-examination at trial is
not sufficient protection, was answered by Justice White,
speaking for the majority in California v. Green:'3
[TIhe inability to cross-examine the witness at the time
he made his prior statement cannot easily be shown to be of
crucial significance as long as the defendant is assured of full
' Weinstein and Berger state:
One practical aspect of the problem should not be lost sight of. While
proponents of the rule as adopted by the Supreme Court point out that
statements made earlier in time may be more reliable, most prior inconsist-
ent statements used at trials are given under circumstances where there are
subtle and sometimes severe pressures operating to skew the story one way
or the other. The inconsistent statement may be given to an insurance inves-
tigator or an FBI agent at the time of arrest, or before a Grand Jury where
the witness can be led, advertently or otherwise, to give a somewhat colored
version of the events. In a swearing contest between the witness and FBI
agents the witness will usually come off second best. Very few such state-
ments used at trial are given in a completely neutral and unpressured set-
ting. Skepticism about such cases explain why the rule was narrowed from
its original breadth.
Id. at 801-73.
' 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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and effective cross-examination at the time of trial. The most
successful cross-examination at the time the prior statement
was made could hardly hope to accomplish more than has
already been accomplished by the fact that the witness is now
telling a different, inconsistent story, and-in this case-one
that is favorable to the defendant.136
The difficulty with this analysis is that it ignores the real
differences between what can be accomplished with cross-
examination at the time the statement is made and what can
be accomplished by showing that the declarant has repudiated
or denied the statement. Effective cross-examination at the
time the statement is made can destroy the statement so com-
pletely that the witness will withdraw it and the jury will be
instructed to disregard it completely."7 But the prior inconsist-
ent statement cannot be destroyed. The witness is treated as
if he were two witnesses-one outside and one inside the court-
room. Nothing that happens to the witness inside the court-
"' Id. at 159. The only question actually decided by the Court in Green was that
the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment does not prohibit all substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements. Id. at 155. The Court's decision even on that limited
question was made only with respect to the prior inconsistent statements made under
oath at a preliminary hearing in the same case as the present prosecution. Id. at 170.
Since Green was actually represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing, id. at 165,
this was one of the strongest cases that could have been presented for substantive use
of prior inconsistent statements. The only defect was that the purpose of cross-
examination at a preliminary hearing has historically been quite different from the
purpose of cross-examination at trial. The Court had recognized that problem in Bar-
ber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), and Mr. Justice Brennan pointed it out in his dissent,
399 U.S. 149, 195-97 (1970), but the Court rejected the distinction. Id. at 165-68.
Despite the fact that the question before the Court in Green was one of constitu-
tional law rather than one of evidence, the factors which the Court discussed are the
same ones which must be considered in deciding the evidence policy question.
"37 Both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have a long series of cases applying the
rule that if a witness clearly repudiates his earlier testimony, the earlier testimony
ceases to have any effect as substantive evidence. Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Ry., 112
N.E. 1025 (Mass. 1916); Morris v. Lodgen, 179 N.E.2d 821 (Mass. 1962); Black v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 86 A. 1066 (Pa. 1913); Wolansky v. Lawson, 133 A.2d
843 (Pa. 1957). This rule cannot apply to mere contradiction, however, when the
witness is not compelled to choose one version or another. Fitzgerald v. McCullogh,
96 N.E.2d 163 (Mass. 1950); Steward v. Ray, 76 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1950). An excellent
student work, Comment, Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Rule against Impeach-
ment of One's Own Witness: The Proposed Federal Rules, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1383 (1974),
asserts: "Most courts hold that conflicts in a witness's testimony should be resolved
by the jury; but when the witness subsequently explains the conflict, finally adhering
to one version and repudiating the other, his later statement controls." Id. at 1391 n.34.
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room can deprive the fact finder of the right to believe the
witness outside the courtroom. Indeed, if the witness inside the
courtroom were to be attacked with the usual devices of the
cross-examiner and shown to be untrustworthy, that would
merely make it all the more likely that the fact finder would
decide to believe the witness outside the courtroom. This is
what happened in Green. The trial court decided to credit the
out-of-court witness whose statements were essential to sup-
port a conviction, despite a reaction to the same witness at trial
which the California Supreme Court described in a footnote as
follows:
[.. The court expressed deep concern over the probative
value of the testimony of this youth "who comes in here and
defies the Court and counsel with his nonresponsive, insolent
answers." In explaining the decision to find defendant guilty,
the court again emphasized "the small probability attached
to the veracity of this young renegade."'3
Under these circumstances the right to conduct cross-
examination which belongs to or may be given to a party
against whom a prior inconsistent statement is offered is not
likely to be used for what we ordinarily think of as cross-
examination. Instead, the party against whom a prior incon-
sistent statement is introduced must undertake to build rather
than to destroy. He must convince the fact finder either that
(1) the in-court witness is trustworthy despite the contradic-
tion, or (2) that there is some explanation, or (3) that the prior
statement is a fraud. In short, substantive use of prior incon-
sistent statements deprives the opposing party of the tools that
can normally be used to attack harmful evidence, and forces
the opposing party to bear the risk that he will not be able to
dispel the effect of the prior inconsistent statements. It is clear,
therefore, that proponents of the Supreme Court version have
either not been aware of the real differences the two versions
produce, or have chosen to ignore them.
Given the very real repercussions of adopting the Supreme
Court version, the remaining question is whether the benefits
of allowing the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements
,3s People v. Green, 479 P.2d 998, 1002 n.5, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 n.5 (1969).
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outweigh the costs. The proponents argue that they do, and
this is in line with the modern attitude that doubtful evidence
should be admitted and evaluated by the jury. The Advisory
Committee made both conventional arguments and also de-
cided that the benefits of allowing prior inconsistent state-
ments as substantive evidence outweighed the costs:
The position taken by the Advisory Committee in formulat-
ing this part of the rule is founded upon an unwillingness to
countenance the general use of prior prepared statements as
substantive evidence, but with a recognition that particular
circumstances call for a contrary result. The judgment is one
more of experience than of logic. The rule requires in each
instance, as a general safeguard, that the declarant actually
testify as a witness, and it then enumerates . . . situations
in which the statement is excepted from the category of hear-
say.
139
The Committee did not explain why their experience told them
that such a rule was needed, but one likely reason was a belief
that the need to prevent evidence and cases from being lost
because a witness has been bought or frightened off was great
enough to justify taking some risks that cases would be won on
the basis of out-of-court statements which had been obtained
by trickery or which were complete fabrications.
It is, as the Advisory Committee suggested, a question of
judgment, and the judgment is not an easy one to make. One
factor that enters into this author's judgment is the fact that a
so-called "turncoat witness" may not be a turncoat at all. A
"prior statement" which the witness never made will look very
much the same as one which the witness did make when both
are introduced in the courtroom. And both will be very hard for
the opposing party to attack. Of course, the opportunity for
fraud exists with respect to all the hearsay that comes in under
the various exceptions. And a fraudulent hearsay statement
always presents great difficulty for the opposing party:
A person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any
particulars, to answer any questions, to solve any difficulties,
to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to
remove any ambiguities; he entrenches himself in the simple
,31 PRoPosED RULES, supra note 4, at 296 (Advisory Committee's note).
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assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely
on his dead or absent author."'
Each of the other exceptions is tied to some theory of reliabil-
ity, however, which has the effect of limiting the time, place
and manner in which it may be claimed such statements were
made. Only the exception for admissions of parties opponent
is as wide open as a general exception for prior inconsistent
statements would be.
This is not to say that the author believes that most incon-
sistent statements are the product of pure fraud or would be
so even with the added incentive of substantive use. It is the
fact that opportunities for successful fraud appear to be so
favorable for those few who would undertake it that tips this
author's judgment against the general substantive use of prior
inconsistent statements.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Evidence are a bold attempt to im-
prove the accuracy and fairness of the results reached by trials
in American courts. They were intended not only to apply to
federal courts but to serve as a model for anticipated state
evidence law reforms. The most notable of the proposed federal
reforms was to be general substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements, but Congress rejected the largest part of that
change.
Even the restricted rule will have great impact in some
cases, especially in federal criminal cases in which prior grand
jury testimony may now be used as substantive evidence. Al-
though the advocates of the new rule frequently declare that it
would be improper to permit a conviction to be based upon a
prior inconsistent statement alone, there remains the unre-
solved question of whether or not the new rule will permit such
a result.
If the congressional restrictions were removed, however,
there would be far reaching effects on federal trials and federal-
state court forum shopping. The basic question is whether it is
"I Chancellor (then Chief Justice) Kent used this description as a quotation with-
out attribution in Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, 50 (1812). Wigmore quotes it
from Kent. 5 WIGIORE § 1362, at 6.
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best to let the evidence come in and "do the best we can" with
it or to keep the evidence out because the "best that can be
done" is not good enough. This article attempts to demonstrate
that Congress was correct in excluding most prior inconsistent
statements from substantive use and concludes by advocating
the retention of the congressional restrictions.
